Opinions

İranlı yetkililerin Hollanda’nın Tahran Büyükelçiliği’nde görevli bir diplomatın çantasını zorla açması iki ülke arasında krize yola açtı. 28 Ocak 2026 tarihinde Hollandalı bir diplomat, havaalanından Tahran’a giriş yaparken durduruldu.

Ukrayna’daki savaş 24 Şubat’ta beşinci yılına girdi. Halihazırda Ukrayna’da bin kilometrelik bir cephede milyonluk iki ordu ne zaman biteceği belli olmayan bir savaş veriyor. Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin savaşın kısa sürede biteceğini varsayarak büyük bir hata yapmıştı. Bugün de Kremlin siyasi hedeflerine ulaşamadığı için Ukrayna’yla barışa tam yanaşmıyor.

The Syrian civil war has had a major impact on relations between Turkey and the United States. Syria has created both areas of cooperation and sources of tension between the two countries. As interests and the regional balance of power shifted, the nature of the relationship also changed.

Ankara has repeatedly made clear that it opposes a military intervention against Iran. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated again on February 5: “We are doing everything to prevent these tensions between the United States and Iran from driving the region into a new conflict and chaos. We clearly expressed our opposition to a military intervention in Iran.” To this end, the Turkish government has also formed a sort of ad hoc alignment with regional countries to lobby the Trump administration against war.

One further step taken by the United States to undermine the financial frameworks associated with the WTO is the instrumentalization of international law itself to that end. This development is particularly striking because it involves leveraging the very legal mechanisms that were originally designed to construct and safeguard the institutional foundations upon which the WTO rests.

Iran built an extensive sphere of influence across the Middle East between 2003 and 2023. This influence has largely—at least for the time being—collapsed following the 2023 war in Gaza with Hamas, the 2024 conflict in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and the December 2024 fall of Syria’s Baath regime. Together, they formed the backbone of Iran’s regional influence.

The experience of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should be a warning for Venezuela’s opposition. Not because Syria and Venezuela are the same, but because they reveal how U.S. policy actually works when hard choices are made. In both cases, Washington has shown that it values stability and workable partners over past alliances or political sympathy. That logic matters far more than the specifics of either country.

The ceasefire signed on January 18 between Damascus and the SDF was not the product of prolonged bargaining or mutual compromise. It was imposed by developments on the ground that had already stripped the SDF of its bargaining power. As such, the ceasefire agreement formalizes the collapse of the March 10 deal and largely marks the end of the SDF’s ability to shape outcomes in Syria.

The protests in Iran are continuing to escalate. What started as a protest by traders against the fall in the value of the local currency, rising prices, economic mismanagement and worsening economic conditions in the country has quickly transformed into a growing movement for political change. This is evident from the chants of protestors and is threatening the legitimacy of the ruling clerical regime.

Videos showed fighting erupting in residential areas as civilians fled en masse, while green buses later transported defeated fighters out of the city under a mediated evacuation arrangement. The Aleppo clashes in early January 2026 brought back grim memories of Syria's civil war, even as the new government in Damascus, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, claimed another military win against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo.

Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

Let me outline three possible scenarios for the post-Maduro era in Venezuela. I call them the “good,” the “bad,” and the “ugly.