As geopolitical escalation intensifies across Eurasia, middle powers are facing more challenges—ensuring their national interests while not fixating on great powers’ shifting priorities. Situated far apart geographically, Turkey and South Korea rarely appear together in strategic discussions. However, the two countries share striking similarities. Both countries have built significant industrial capacities, face revisionist neighbors, act within the boundaries of the US-led alliance structure, yet maneuver more independently at the same time, pursuing strategic autonomy within the fragmented international order.
The division of labor between middle powers—Turkey and South Korea—could evolve into a practical role model. Such cooperation does not necessitate formal alliances, a defense treaty or ideological alignment that could trigger geopolitical backlash. Instead, a realistic and useful structure could be built through elements that both countries share: industrial might, vulnerability in the maritime field, concerns about energy security, and increasing crisis management capability. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Turkey on 24 November 2025 offers a recent example of this engagement.
Complementary Strength and Unsought Potential
From a historical perspective, Turkey–South Korea relations were cordial yet shallow. In recent years, the two countries’ partnership was centered on defense cooperation including artillery systems, armored vehicles, and engine-integration projects. In this regard, Turkey has begun serial production of an indigenously designed Turkish tank, ALTAY, using South Korean-made engines for the initial batch of 85 units. These Korean engines are intended to serve as a temporary solution while Turkey works to finalize its domestic BATU engine system.
As South Korea expanded its defense exports and Turkey emerged as a major manufacturer of drones, autonomous platforms, and electronic warfare (EW) systems, such cooperation accelerated. Nevertheless, such alignment reflected the geographical condition and constraints shaped by great power politics; as a result, the cooperation did not mature into a structured security partnership.
While Turkey had to manage unstable neighbors ranging from the East Mediterranean to the Black Sea, South Korea needs to wisely handle the complex balance of power in the Indo-Pacific as well as North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Both countries fully understand that overly formalized cooperation could arouse misunderstanding in their respective regions, and could cause unwanted coercion from great powers. Therefore, cooperation should gradually evolve without any symbolism—directly related to alliances—or explicit alignment.
Genuine opportunity lies in clearly perceiving that the two countries possess industrial and strategic advantages that are complementary. Turkey’s drone, electronic warfare, and innovative modular naval design are naturally connected to South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding capability, precision strike systems, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). Such commonality offers fertile ground for cooperation that ensures they are not entangled in geopolitical affairs yet are strengthening resilience.
Maritime Security and Energy Resilience as a Strategic Pillar
The most overlooked common issue between Turkey and South Korea is maritime security. Although both countries operate in different maritime areas, the two countries are heavily dependent on stable sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for energy trade. Turkey is situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, while South Korea depends on a long maritime route that connects the Middle East to Northeast Asia. Both countries face growing maritime risks, ranging from the rise of non-regular actors to great power rivalry.
Under such circumstances, meaningful cooperation does not necessarily require joint military exercises. Instead, sharing model examples of maritime domain awareness (MDA), intelligence exchange on evolving threats, and cooperation on next-generation frigates or the development of unmanned maritime platforms would be feasible. Turkey’s MILGEM program—which values modularity—complements South Korea’s strong shipbuilding industry. Joint development of multi-purpose offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) or hybrid propulsion ships could contribute to both countries’ export objectives as well as maritime stability.
Energy security strengthens the logic of cooperation. To place itself as a regional energy hub, Turkey is trying to balance its exports with ambitions for transit and storage, while South Korea is among the world’s largest LNG importers, making it very vulnerable to energy cuts. Both countries share a weakness regarding external impact and core infrastructure. Joint research on LNG convoy security, cyber defense for energy terminals, supply chain issues of renewable energy, and dependency on key minerals would serve mutual interests that is practical and relatively low-risk.
Discussions on small modular reactor (SMR) and hydrogen-based energy logistics would strengthen long-term energy resilience, without triggering political sensitivities. Turkey is considering a trilateral partnership with the United States and South Korea to build its second nuclear power plant. In this context, during South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Turkey on 24 November 2025, the two countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear cooperation.
A Practical Model for Responsible Middle-Power Cooperation
Beyond defense and the maritime field, both countries possess growing capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster management. Having experienced a massive earthquake and being involved in disaster relief activities, Turkey naturally aligns with South Korea, which has professional overseas disaster response capabilities. Cooperation on early warning systems, sharing of standards on medical or engineering logistics, and joint exercises would deepen cooperation in a politically neutral field, while consolidating the two countries’ reputation as responsible actors in the international arena.
The effectiveness of Turkey–South Korea cooperation depends on a realistic and non-aligned approach. Neither country should attempt to forge an explicit alliance with the other party, nor would such an approach contribute to regional stability. A structural yet flexible bilateral roadmap that is centered on technical collaboration, functional cooperation, and selective problem solving would enable the cooperation to gradually evolve and withstand political pressure. Such an approach would give both Ankara and Seoul wiggle room for strategic maneuverability while contributing to broader regional security under intensifying geopolitical rivalry.
Such a novel model of cooperation reflects the new reality of global politics. Great powers are approaching commitments more selectively, placing middle powers in a position to bear greater responsibilities for regional stability. Equipped with dynamic industries and strategic autonomy, Turkey and South Korea showcase how middle powers could cooperate yet not trigger geopolitical backlash. Based on practical needs and cautious restraint, cooperation between both countries could become a useful role model for others that are navigating the multipolar world.
The genuine strategic value of Turkey–South Korea cooperation is not in alliance formation, but in crafting an adequate middle-power partnership in today’s fragmented order. By centering their focus on technical complementarity, maritime and energy stability, and crisis management capabilities, both countries could reinforce autonomy and enhance regional stability—especially where it is frequently subject to conflict and chaos. Through careful design and a pragmatic approach, Ankara and Seoul could offer a distinctive and replicable model that factors in the realities of a multipolar world and the responsibilities of newly emerging middle powers.
* Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as the President at the Security Management Institute.
** The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of instituDE.
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