The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will sign today a peace agreement at the White House in Washington. This agreement reflects a notable geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus. With Russia’s diminished influence in the region following the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, Turkey is well placed to expand its influence in the Caucasus.

Turkish President Erdoğan announced this week that Turkey would terminate its pipeline agreement with Iraq, effective in one year. The move followed a painful agreement between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over revenue-sharing. This would normally have led to the reopening of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which was shut down following an arbitration ruling against Turkey in March 2023.

On July 16, Israeli warplanes bombed parts of Damascus, including the defense ministry and a site near the presidential palace. While the Israeli government claims that its recent airstrikes in Syria are meant to protect the Druze minority, the absence of similar interventions during the bloodiest years of the Syrian civil war suggests that more is at play.

İsrail’in hava saldırıları İran’ın iç istikrarını da hedef alıyor. Uzmanlarımız bu sürecin rejim değişikliğine evrilip evrilmeyeceğini değerlendirdi.

İsrail, 13 Haziran 2025’te İran’ın nükleer ve askeri altyapısına yönelik geniş çaplı bir hava saldırısı düzenleyerek çok sayıda hedefi vurdu; aralarında üst düzey generaller ve nükleer bilimcilerin de bulunduğu onlarca kişi öldü. Operasyon, İran’ın nükleer kapasitesini kalıcı olarak ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlarken, Tahran’ın nükleer silah geliştirme konusunda siyasi bir karar alma eşiğine gelmiş olabileceği endişelerini de artırdı.

India’s perception is that Ankara is not only favoring Islamabad diplomatically, but also materially bolstering its defense capacity in ways that impact the regional military balance. For Turkey, engaging Pakistan should not necessarily come at the expense of ties with India. Yet Turkey’s current policy risks reinforcing precisely that trajectory.

18 Ekim Çarşamba günü Ömer Güler, Enes Esen, Servet Akman, Haşim Tekineş ve İmdat Öner İsrail-Hamas Savaşı'na dair hastane saldırısı dahil son gelişmeleri, Gazze'ye kara harekatını, Türkiye'nin gelişmelere dair tepkilerini ve savaşın küresel ve bölgesel sonuçlarını Twitter Space yayınında ele aldılar.

Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi ülkeler arasında yıllardır devam eden müzakerelerin sonunda yeni bir iltica ve göç sistemi konusunda Haziran ayında nitelikli çoğunlukla bir anlaşma sağlandı. Önümüzdeki sene Haziran ayında yapılacak AB milletvekili seçimleri öncesinde AB Parlamentosu ve Komisyon arasındaki görüşmelerin tamamlanması ve bahse konu anlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesi bekleniyor. Anlaşma incelendiğinde esas hedefin caydırıcılığın arttırılarak kaçak göçmenlerin AB dışında tutulmasının sağlanması olduğu görülüyor.

Turkish armed drones, in particular, have become one of the most sought-after UAVs in recent years. The medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV Bayraktar TB2 drone, one of many produced by the Turkish arms industry, has been exported to 24 countries. Although the Turkish government has not publicly stated where Turkish armed drones have been exported, the list reportedly includes Qatar, Libya, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Pakistan, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Togo, Niger, Nigeria, Polonia, Romania, Algeria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, and Senegal.

The rapprochement efforts between Turkey and Egypt are not just important for these two countries. They have also imminent consequences for Libya and the Brotherhood. An agreement between Turkey and Egypt would boost the chances of the viability of Libya’s unity government.

To justify its military operations in Syria, Turkey has referred to self-defense and counterterrorism, and vaguely invoked humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect civilians. In Libya, however, Turkey invoked UN resolutions and bilateral security agreements for its operations.

This study focuses on the geopolitical dimensions and constraints shaping Turkey’s ambition to become a natural gas hub. The emphasis is on Turkey’s diplomatic relations with key supplier countries, the political instability across the wider Middle East, and the limited capacity of neighboring states to produce and export gas reliably—factors that collectively can make or undermine Turkey’s hub ambitions.