İstanbul’da Ukrayna operasyonları kapsamında Deniz Unsur Komutanlığı ve Adana’da Çok Uluslu NATO Karargahı kurulacağı yönündeki haberler kamuoyunda tartışmaya neden oldu. Türk halkı doğal olarak bölgede biri bitip öbürü başlayan savaşlara ülkenin sürüklenmesinden endişe ediyor.

Turkey’s expanding role in the Horn of Africa is no longer limited to diplomacy or development assistance. It has become a security actor in the region’s civil wars. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are also taking more active positions in these conflicts.

The Turkish government views the potential collapse of the Iranian regime as a harbinger of regional instability. Nonetheless, Ankara remains convinced that the Iranian regime will survive this ordeal, even after the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Ukrayna’daki savaş 24 Şubat’ta beşinci yılına girdi. Halihazırda Ukrayna’da bin kilometrelik bir cephede milyonluk iki ordu ne zaman biteceği belli olmayan bir savaş veriyor. Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin savaşın kısa sürede biteceğini varsayarak büyük bir hata yapmıştı. Bugün de Kremlin siyasi hedeflerine ulaşamadığı için Ukrayna’yla barışa tam yanaşmıyor.

Ankara has repeatedly made clear that it opposes a military intervention against Iran. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated again on February 5: “We are doing everything to prevent these tensions between the United States and Iran from driving the region into a new conflict and chaos. We clearly expressed our opposition to a military intervention in Iran.” To this end, the Turkish government has also formed a sort of ad hoc alignment with regional countries to lobby the Trump administration against war.

The experience of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should be a warning for Venezuela’s opposition. Not because Syria and Venezuela are the same, but because they reveal how U.S. policy actually works when hard choices are made. In both cases, Washington has shown that it values stability and workable partners over past alliances or political sympathy. That logic matters far more than the specifics of either country.

18 Ekim Çarşamba günü Ömer Güler, Enes Esen, Servet Akman, Haşim Tekineş ve İmdat Öner İsrail-Hamas Savaşı'na dair hastane saldırısı dahil son gelişmeleri, Gazze'ye kara harekatını, Türkiye'nin gelişmelere dair tepkilerini ve savaşın küresel ve bölgesel sonuçlarını Twitter Space yayınında ele aldılar.

Without further diversification of suppliers, expanded renewable capacity, strategic investments in LNG, and nuclear partnerships beyond Russia, Turkey risks exchanging one form of energy dependency for another.

Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi ülkeler arasında yıllardır devam eden müzakerelerin sonunda yeni bir iltica ve göç sistemi konusunda Haziran ayında nitelikli çoğunlukla bir anlaşma sağlandı. Önümüzdeki sene Haziran ayında yapılacak AB milletvekili seçimleri öncesinde AB Parlamentosu ve Komisyon arasındaki görüşmelerin tamamlanması ve bahse konu anlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesi bekleniyor. Anlaşma incelendiğinde esas hedefin caydırıcılığın arttırılarak kaçak göçmenlerin AB dışında tutulmasının sağlanması olduğu görülüyor.

Turkish armed drones, in particular, have become one of the most sought-after UAVs in recent years. The medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV Bayraktar TB2 drone, one of many produced by the Turkish arms industry, has been exported to 24 countries. Although the Turkish government has not publicly stated where Turkish armed drones have been exported, the list reportedly includes Qatar, Libya, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Pakistan, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Togo, Niger, Nigeria, Polonia, Romania, Algeria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, and Senegal.

The rapprochement efforts between Turkey and Egypt are not just important for these two countries. They have also imminent consequences for Libya and the Brotherhood. An agreement between Turkey and Egypt would boost the chances of the viability of Libya’s unity government.

To justify its military operations in Syria, Turkey has referred to self-defense and counterterrorism, and vaguely invoked humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect civilians. In Libya, however, Turkey invoked UN resolutions and bilateral security agreements for its operations.

This report analyzes Turkey’s vision for Syria following the fall of the Assad family and the rise of the HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. In this regard, it focuses on the foreign actors that, alongside Turkey, now have the greatest ability to shape Syria’s future: namely the United States and Israel.

This study evaluates, through long-term projections to 2053, the potential impact of increased EV penetration on Turkey’s energy landscape. It provides a comparative assessment of how changes in the share of EVs within the total vehicle fleet, across several scenario frameworks, could influence fuel demand and petroleum import volumes. A second, closely related objective is to measure the scale of Turkey’s oil dependency in order to establish a basis for examining its policy implications.

This study focuses on the geopolitical dimensions and constraints shaping Turkey’s ambition to become a natural gas hub. The emphasis is on Turkey’s diplomatic relations with key supplier countries, the political instability across the wider Middle East, and the limited capacity of neighboring states to produce and export gas reliably—factors that collectively can make or undermine Turkey’s hub ambitions.