In February 2026, India joined the Pax Silica Declaration, a US-led supply-chain framework designed to secure mainly critical minerals and semiconductors (also known as chips). Prior to that, the Indian government established India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) in 2021 to strengthen the domestic semiconductor ecosystem by about 10 billion US dollars of subsidy. For years, India’s semiconductor ambition has attracted less attention than the equivalents in the USA, EU, Japan and South Korea. As American memory giant Micron Technology started its manufacturing in Gujarat in February 2026, India’s ambitions seem to finally start making progress with international and domestic supports.

Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz may ultimately prove more consequential than its military campaign in reshaping the region's energy landscape. Saudi Arabia is operating its pipeline to the Red Sea at capacity and evaluating an expansion. The United Arab Emirates is constructing a second line to bypass Hormuz.

On June 14–15, 2026, Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited London and Rome signed a range of agreements on defense, clean energy, and technology with her British and Italian counterparts. The biggest news to supply chain watchers was a pair of memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Rapidus — Japan's state-backed advanced semiconductor foundry — with the UK Semiconductor Centre and Italy's Chips-IT.

Avrupa Birliği, onlarca yıldır ekonomik bütünleşme, serbest ticaret anlaşmaları ve ortak pazar sayesinde dünya ekonomisinde söz sahibi bir aktör oldu. Ama son yıllardaki ticaret savaşları, enerji krizleri ve jeopolitik gerilimler bu gücün ne kadar sağlam olduğunu tartışmaya açtı. Bazıları Avrupa’nın eski avantajını kaybettiğini söylerken, diğerleri AB'nin hala ciddi bir güç kaynağı olduğunu savunuyor.

Suriname, a small South American country of roughly 640,000 people located between Guyana and French Guiana, is about to become rich. In October 2024, the French oil major TotalEnergies and its American partner APA Corporation committed $10.5 billion to a single deepwater project off its coast. When production begins in 2028, the country will pump 220,000 barrels a day. Revenue over the life of the field could reach $26 billion, more than six times the size of Suriname’s current $4.3 billion economy.

The Nipepe plant is the clearest signal yet that Beijing is extending its control over critical mineral supply chains beyond Chinese borders, moving upstream into African extraction and processing at the precise moment Western operators have pulled back. The implications for the global battery supply chain, and for European and American efforts to diversify away from Chinese mineral dependence, are significant.

This report is addressed to two audiences simultaneously: Turkish policymakers weighing how to develop the Beylikova deposit, and Western governments and companies assessing whether Turkey is a credible partner in their supply chain diversification strategies. It examines both the opportunities Turkey’s entry into the rare earth sector could realistically generate and the structural obstacles that stand between the current situation and those outcomes.

This report analyzes Turkey’s vision for Syria following the fall of the Assad family and the rise of the HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. In this regard, it focuses on the foreign actors that, alongside Turkey, now have the greatest ability to shape Syria’s future: namely the United States and Israel.

This study evaluates, through long-term projections to 2053, the potential impact of increased EV penetration on Turkey’s energy landscape. It provides a comparative assessment of how changes in the share of EVs within the total vehicle fleet, across several scenario frameworks, could influence fuel demand and petroleum import volumes. A second, closely related objective is to measure the scale of Turkey’s oil dependency in order to establish a basis for examining its policy implications.

The Turkey–EU Customs Union, established in 1995, has been a defining feature of trade relations between Turkey and the European Union. Over the past three decades, the global economic landscape has evolved significantly, necessitating a modernization of the agreement to address new trade realities, regulatory developments, and emerging geopolitical challenges.

This report focuses on Turkey's prominence as an emerging market for cocaine trafficking and organized crime in the last decade. Cocaine production in Latin America has dramatically increased since 2013, and Turkey’s status as an emerging market has attracted the attention of Latin American government officials on the front lines of the cocaine trade.

This report sets out to provide a comprehensive analysis of the tactics employed by the Erdoğan administration to achieve repressive goals abroad and the vulnerabilities and how they are enabled by the AML and CFT regulation in place.