Ties between the United States and India have been traversing a rather slippery slope since the beginning of President Trump’s second term in power. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the leaders to receive an in-person meeting at the White House. However, compared to the previous U.S. administrations, the Trump administration’s approach toward New Delhi has been less accommodating. As Trump 2.0’s second administration kicked off, it carried out a tighter crackdown on Indian-origin illegal immigrants based in the U.S. It has also imposed steep 50 percent reciprocal tariffs on Indian exports to the U.S., including 25 percent fines for purchasing Russian oil. In addition, the U.S. tightened restrictions on H1-B visas that have historically favoured Indian tech professionals.
Quite naturally, such developments have brought into question the robustness of the U.S.-India strategic partnership, which has been the cornerstone of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy for quite some time. Nonetheless, two recent developments have stood out amid this downward trend. First, in February 2025, during PM Modi’s visit to Washington, a bilateral Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce, and Technology (COMPACT) agreement was signed. And second, in October, the U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh signed a ten-year U.S.–India Framework Defence Agreement on the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit.
The COMPACT agreement offered a rather detailed roadmap, providing insight into how both states plan to proceed with their bilateral cooperation on diverse matters including trade, defence, and energy security. However, it appeared to overwhelmingly prioritise defence relations – more specifically U.S. military sales to New Delhi. In the same vein, the framework partnership was signed to deepen defence cooperation between the U.S. and India for the next ten years. Statements by Hegseth and Singh indicate that Washington and New Delhi are seeking to enhance coordination, information-sharing, and technology cooperation. This agreement is in fact a periodic renewal of the framework defence agreements that have been signed between the U.S. and India, with the first one being signed in 1995. Prior to this, framework defence agreements between Washington and New Delhi were renewed in 2015 and 2005.
Broadly, these framework agreements emphasised mechanisms such as the Defence Policy Group, Defence Procurement and Production Group, and Joint Working Groups. However, in practice, such institutions have done little to give momentum to bilateral military cooperation. For instance, the establishment of the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) - which sought to ease co-development and co-production - was seen as a landmark achievement. Nonetheless, over the years, it struggled to deliver any tangible results. The U.S.–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), launched in 2022, sought to bolster co-production in critical emerging technologies in defence, space and next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Much like DTTI, however, the iCET has also remained quite unable to generate anything tangible.
This latest framework agreement, like the previous ones, is mostly a declaration of intent, which articulates how both countries envision their defence cooperation rather than specifying concrete commitments. Therefore, the agreement may not provide a wide set of tangible targets for the India-U.S. strategic partnership.
A convenient explanation for the inability of such frameworks to deliver on their promises is bureaucratic procedures, which are infamously cumbersome and frequently result in delays. Moreover, at times, Washington has also deliberately slowed these processes; sometimes due to political arm-twisting, other times to avoid transferring its highly prized defence technologies. Here, delays in deliveries of jet engines, delayed revisions to the ITAR regulations and absence of any substantial co-productions are cases in point. Hence, there remains a degree of scepticism in New Delhi with regard to Washington’s commitment to the strategic partnership.
Washington has its own reasons as well. New Delhi’s long-standing policy of maintaining its defence relations with Russia and China, even as it seeks to benefit from defence and technology cooperation with the United States, has been considered problematic.
In 2018, immediately after signing the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement with Washington, New Delhi proceeded to purchase the Russian-origin S-400 missile defence system. This led Washington to threaten New Delhi with sanctions under America’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This disjuncture has only become more prominent following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with India emerging as one of the principal purchasers of Russian oil alongside China and Turkey. The United States has further contended that India’s continued purchases have helped sustain Russia’s wartime revenues.
Similarly, New Delhi’s long-standing adherence to its non-alignment policy has been consequential. The QUAD alliance, comprising the United States, India, Japan and Australia, was revived in 2017 as a bulwark against China's growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, but has since been reduced to a consultative and research mechanism rather than a security coalition. The creation of the “Squad”, which includes the United States, Japan, Australia and South Korea, reflected Washington’s diminishing reliance on New Delhi as a strategic cushion in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the military conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025, not only brought India back to direct comparison with Pakistan, but also raised questions about the ability of the Indian armed forces to credibly confront a far stronger Chinese military in any future conflict.
These agreements have been signed amid tense U.S.-India relations and a very strained Modi-Trump equation. Although Modi’s meeting with Trump did not result in any definite understanding on a trade deal, the signing of the agreement during his visit to Washington nevertheless received fanfare. Nonetheless, there was some speculation that the Indian Prime Minister declined to attend the ASEAN Summit to avoid meeting the U.S. President. To defuse tensions, New Delhi has intensified its lobbying efforts in Washington. This is not to suggest the utility of the strategic partnership is diminishing for either of the two states. The U.S. sees India as a lucrative market for its defence-related exports. New Delhi, on the other hand, faces pressing defence modernisation requirements, which have only further intensified following its recent military confrontation with Pakistan. In any case, the India–U.S. partnership will remain strong in the long term, despite its ups and downs.
*Maryam Raashed is a research associate at the Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad.
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