Turkey's decision to nominate Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu for UN secretary-general looks, at first glance, like a proud moment for Turkish diplomacy. He has spent more than four decades in the Turkish foreign service. When a diplomat with that résumé is put forward for the world's top diplomatic job, it is worth taking notice. Any serious assessment of his candidacy has to look at how he wielded power in Ankara, the foreign-policy choices he advocated, and the record of the years when he was in charge.

The results of the U.S. midterm elections exceeded even the most optimistic Democratic forecasts. What had been anticipated as a blue wave became, in effect, a blue tsunami. For Turkey, the outcome carries particular significance. Over the last decade, Ankara has built its Washington strategy largely on Erdoğan's personal rapport with Trump rather than on institutional ties with Congress. A weakened U.S. president facing a more assertive legislature, where distrust of Erdoğan cuts across party lines, leaves that strategy exposed.

A change of leadership in Israel is unlikely to alter its foreign policy. (For Israel, however, a change of leadership in Ankara would make all the difference.) Tensions between Turkey and Israel are therefore likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Syria, where both countries are active and pursue opposing goals, remains the most dangerous arena. Preventing an escalation there will require sustained American engagement with both sides, rather than dismissing the dispute between Turkey and Israel as mere political theater.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s arrival at Baku airport marked a new low in recent Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Fidan had travelled to attend the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which brings together heads of state. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not attend, possibly in protest against harsh remarks from Baku.

There is an old, unforgiving rule in financial markets: when the relationship between risk and return appears to have broken down, it is rarely the risk that has disappeared. More often, it is the market's willingness to recognize it.

By activating the collective defense mechanism, the Turkish government is not only joining a war in Yemen but also becoming part of a regional conflict that could have much larger consequences than Ankara anticipates. As this regional war drags on, the stakes will rise for all parties, pushing them to take greater risks. Ankara may therefore find that what begins as a limited military deployment in Saudi Arabia ultimately ends centuries of relative peace between Turkey and Iran.

Turkey has never been a full-fledged democracy. Throughout its modern history, the country has experienced military interventions, restrictions on political freedoms and serious human rights violations. Yet, despite these shortcomings, Turkey held a significant place within the Western democratic order. It became a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949, joined NATO in 1952, and accepted the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) in 1987 and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1990.

This report is addressed to two audiences simultaneously: Turkish policymakers weighing how to develop the Beylikova deposit, and Western governments and companies assessing whether Turkey is a credible partner in their supply chain diversification strategies. It examines both the opportunities Turkey’s entry into the rare earth sector could realistically generate and the structural obstacles that stand between the current situation and those outcomes.

This report analyzes Turkey’s vision for Syria following the fall of the Assad family and the rise of the HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. In this regard, it focuses on the foreign actors that, alongside Turkey, now have the greatest ability to shape Syria’s future: namely the United States and Israel.

This study evaluates, through long-term projections to 2053, the potential impact of increased EV penetration on Turkey’s energy landscape. It provides a comparative assessment of how changes in the share of EVs within the total vehicle fleet, across several scenario frameworks, could influence fuel demand and petroleum import volumes. A second, closely related objective is to measure the scale of Turkey’s oil dependency in order to establish a basis for examining its policy implications.

This study focuses on the geopolitical dimensions and constraints shaping Turkey’s ambition to become a natural gas hub. The emphasis is on Turkey’s diplomatic relations with key supplier countries, the political instability across the wider Middle East, and the limited capacity of neighboring states to produce and export gas reliably—factors that collectively can make or undermine Turkey’s hub ambitions.

The Turkey–EU Customs Union, established in 1995, has been a defining feature of trade relations between Turkey and the European Union. Over the past three decades, the global economic landscape has evolved significantly, necessitating a modernization of the agreement to address new trade realities, regulatory developments, and emerging geopolitical challenges.