On August 7, 2026, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed a trilateral defense pact in Mecca, each committing to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Coming amid the Iran-US war and a renewed Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia, the agreement has drawn immediate comparison to NATO's Article 5. Our experts weigh in.

Turkey stands closer to ending its four-decade war with the PKK. A draft framework law, the product of more than two years of negotiations with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, reached parliament this week, and a plenary vote is expected soon. An end to the armed conflict would benefit Turkey and the wider region. The way the government has drafted the law and managed the process, however, carries several warning signs that temper such optimism.

Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz may ultimately prove more consequential than its military campaign in reshaping the region's energy landscape. Saudi Arabia is operating its pipeline to the Red Sea at capacity and evaluating an expansion. The United Arab Emirates is constructing a second line to bypass Hormuz.

The agreement provides Iran with substantial gains, including sanctions relief, an end to hostilities extending to Lebanon, and tacit acceptance of its ballistic missile program. The two sides also retain a 60-day window to negotiate a final settlement on the nuclear file. From Ankara's perspective, a settlement preserving the Iranian state was always more likely than the regime change pursued by Washington and Israel.

While it remains too early to fully assess the long-term consequences of the Gaza war, one outcome is obvious: whatever Hamas hoped to achieve on October 7, the fallout has significantly undermined Iran's quasi-hegemonic position in the region.

The Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously defined war not merely as an act of violence, but as "the continuation of politics by other means" — an extension of diplomacy rather than its abandonment. Wars are not fought to satisfy some destructive impulse, nor do states enter conflict for its own sake.

This report analyzes Turkey’s vision for Syria following the fall of the Assad family and the rise of the HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. In this regard, it focuses on the foreign actors that, alongside Turkey, now have the greatest ability to shape Syria’s future: namely the United States and Israel.