Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has opened a new chapter in Turkish–Israeli relations. For a long time, the Assad regime was a major security concern for Turkey. For Israel, it was “the devil they knew.” Israel focused on containing the Assad regime and Iran’s proxies, while Turkey’s military presence in Syria remained a secondary issue.

On the eve of the civil war, Syria was a lower-middle-income country with steady growth and relatively stable macroeconomic indicators. Between 2000 and 2010, real GDP grew by an average of 4.8 percent annually, inflation averaged 4.9 percent. Trade accounted for 64 percent of GDP, and GDP per capita stood at 2,731 dollars in 2010.

Israel’s superior air power and strike capabilities during the 12-Day War exposed Iran’s structural weaknesses. Yet the consequences of this confrontation extend well beyond the battlefield. The war has acted as a catalyst, accelerating trends already present inside Iran and pushing the political system into a phase of recalibration. 

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) emerged as a dominant military and territorial actor in eastern Syria following the U.S.-led campaign against ISIS. Their control of large areas has created sustained tension with Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the PKK. Turkey’s opposition to an independent SDF military structure, alongside Damascus’s efforts to reassert authority in eastern Syria, has made the status of the YPG, the SDF’s armed wing, a central issue in the negotiations, including the most recent talks in December.

President Donald Trump has issued an executive order to designate several chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations. The order is a reflection of sustained lobbying by the United Arab Emirates and Israel, with support from other Arab governments. While the designation reflects regional geopolitical pressures more than U.S. domestic concerns, it will nevertheless create complications for Turkey and Qatar, both of which maintain close ties with the movement.