Iran built an extensive sphere of influence across the Middle East between 2003 and 2023. This influence has largely—at least for the time being—collapsed following the 2023 war in Gaza with Hamas, the 2024 conflict in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and the December 2024 fall of Syria’s Baath regime. Together, they formed the backbone of Iran’s regional influence.

The experience of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should be a warning for Venezuela’s opposition. Not because Syria and Venezuela are the same, but because they reveal how U.S. policy actually works when hard choices are made. In both cases, Washington has shown that it values stability and workable partners over past alliances or political sympathy. That logic matters far more than the specifics of either country.

The ceasefire signed on January 18 between Damascus and the SDF was not the product of prolonged bargaining or mutual compromise. It was imposed by developments on the ground that had already stripped the SDF of its bargaining power. As such, the ceasefire agreement formalizes the collapse of the March 10 deal and largely marks the end of the SDF’s ability to shape outcomes in Syria.

The protests in Iran are continuing to escalate. What started as a protest by traders against the fall in the value of the local currency, rising prices, economic mismanagement and worsening economic conditions in the country has quickly transformed into a growing movement for political change. This is evident from the chants of protestors and is threatening the legitimacy of the ruling clerical regime.

Videos showed fighting erupting in residential areas as civilians fled en masse, while green buses later transported defeated fighters out of the city under a mediated evacuation arrangement. The Aleppo clashes in early January 2026 brought back grim memories of Syria's civil war, even as the new government in Damascus, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, claimed another military win against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo.

Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

This report analyzes Turkey’s vision for Syria following the fall of the Assad family and the rise of the HTS under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa. In this regard, it focuses on the foreign actors that, alongside Turkey, now have the greatest ability to shape Syria’s future: namely the United States and Israel.