The protests in Iran are continuing to escalate. What started as a protest by traders against the fall in the value of the local currency, rising prices, economic mismanagement and worsening economic conditions in the country has quickly transformed into a growing movement for political change. This is evident from the chants of protestors and is threatening the legitimacy of the ruling clerical regime.

Videos showed fighting erupting in residential areas as civilians fled en masse, while green buses later transported defeated fighters out of the city under a mediated evacuation arrangement. The Aleppo clashes in early January 2026 brought back grim memories of Syria's civil war, even as the new government in Damascus, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, claimed another military win against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo.

Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has opened a new chapter in Turkish–Israeli relations. For a long time, the Assad regime was a major security concern for Turkey. For Israel, it was “the devil they knew.” Israel focused on containing the Assad regime and Iran’s proxies, while Turkey’s military presence in Syria remained a secondary issue.

On the eve of the civil war, Syria was a lower-middle-income country with steady growth and relatively stable macroeconomic indicators. Between 2000 and 2010, real GDP grew by an average of 4.8 percent annually, inflation averaged 4.9 percent. Trade accounted for 64 percent of GDP, and GDP per capita stood at 2,731 dollars in 2010.

Israel’s superior air power and strike capabilities during the 12-Day War exposed Iran’s structural weaknesses. Yet the consequences of this confrontation extend well beyond the battlefield. The war has acted as a catalyst, accelerating trends already present inside Iran and pushing the political system into a phase of recalibration.