Under the terms of Trump's 20-point Gaza peace plan, Hamas is expected to transfer control of Gaza first to an international body and eventually to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Trump administration anticipates that Hamas will eventually wither away as this process unfolds. Ankara, however, may be reluctant to go along with this process. On October 21, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Chief of Intelligence İbrahim Kalın met with Hamas leaders in Doha, a meeting that once again underscores Ankara’s determination to remain engaged in Gaza’s political future through Hamas.
Hamas Plans to Be Part of Gaza’s New Power Structure
While Hamas has formally accepted the ceasefire’s terms, it continues to view itself as an integral part of Gaza’s governance. As such, Hamas declared its determination to be included in a comprehensive Palestinian national framework. Similarly, when asked about disarmament, Hamas politburo member Mohammed Nazzal said on October 16: "I can't answer with a yes or no. Frankly, it depends on the nature of the project. The disarmament project you're talking about, what does it mean? To whom will the weapons be handed over?"
In this regard, one of Hamas’s first actions after the ceasefire was to target potential rivals who could threaten its authority in the Strip. Some of these were reportedly criminal groups accused of looting aid convoys or collaborating with the Israeli army. Others, however, were families known for their political affiliation with Hamas’s political rival, including Al-Fatah. For instance, Hamas forces attacked the Fatah-linked Mujaida clan in Khan Younis on October 3, killing at least 25 members and arresting dozens. The clan, historically affiliated with Fatah and viewed by Hamas as a potential threat, was targeted in what Palestinian officials described as a “preemptive strike” to prevent a possible revolt against Hamas rule.
Turkey’s Stake in Hamas’ Future In Gaza
Turkey, for its part, may not be entirely opposed to Hamas maintaining influence in Gaza. Ankara has invested heavily, politically and diplomatically, in its relationship with the group and may now seek to keep Hamas within the political framework of Gaza’s administration.
First, Hamas remains Turkey’s most important source of leverage in the Palestinian question. Despite repeated US and Israeli objections, Turkey has hosted Hamas’s political leaders, including in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks. Some reports have suggested that Israel contemplated targeting Hamas figures residing in Turkey. Yet Ankara has finally derived diplomatic benefits from maintaining those channels. One of Turkey’s most visible diplomatic achievements in recent months was its participation — alongside Qatar, Egypt, and the United States — in brokering the Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire . Without its ties to Hamas, Turkey’s ability to play a role in Gaza would be severely diminished. Ankara would like to keep this leverage.
Second, the ceasefire in Gaza remains fragile. Neither Israel nor Hamas is entirely satisfied with the terms. The United States and its partners will continue to rely on intermediaries capable of exerting pressure on Hamas, and as long as the group survives, Turkey will retain some influence in its relations with Washington.
Third, any move to eliminate Hamas from Gaza would likely be perceived by the Turkish citizens as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Turkish public opinion is overwhelmingly supportive of the Palestinians. According to a 2025 Pew Research Center survey, 93 percent of adults in Turkey hold an unfavorable view of Israel, the highest among all 24 countries surveyed, while only 4 percent expressed a favorable opinion. The AKP may therefore prefer to accommodate Hamas’s continued role in Gaza rather than risk alienating its constituency.
Fourth, Ankara’s approach to Hamas also reflects a broader pattern in its regional policy. The AKP government has consistently aligned itself with movements affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, viewing them as natural ideological partners. In Tunisia it was Rached Ghannouchi’s Ennahda; in Egypt, Mohamed Morsi’s government; in Libya, the Tripoli-based administration; and in Sudan, the military leadership of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Hamas, as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, fits naturally within this network of alliances. Abandoning Hamas would therefore mean partly distancing itself from a strategy that has guided much of Turkey’s Middle East policy over the past two decades.
Turkish officials do not see Hamas as an organization likely to disappear soon. Besides, Ankara does not view Hamas as a terrorist organization but as a legitimate political and resistance movement central to the Palestinian question. In this vein, Turkey seems intent on ensuring that Hamas retains a role, however limited, in Gaza’s administration. If Hamas loses ground, Ankara risks losing one of its influential tools in the region. For that reason, Ankara may seek to hold on to it for as long as possible.
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