Will Turkey Acquire Nuclear Weapons?

For decades, Turkey has relied on NATO’s nuclear deterrence, with U.S. warheads stationed at Incirlik Air Base. But shifting regional dynamics have begun to test this arrangement. Israel’s military operations in Syria, its regional overreach, and uncertainty over NATO’s willingness to defend Turkey raise a troubling question: could Ankara rethink its nuclear stance?

Inside Turkey, the nuclear debate is no longer confined to policymakers. According to a survey conducted by Research Istanbul in July, 71% of respondents said Turkey should start developing nuclear weapons, while only 18% opposed and 11% were undecided. The same poll found that 72% of the public do not believe NATO would defend Turkey in the event of an attack. Foreign observers also see the logic. Gérard Araud, former French ambassador to the U.S. and the UN, tweeted in June after the war between Israel and Iran that in Turkey’s position he would start seriously considering the nuclear option.

Scenarios That Could Push Turkey Toward Nuclear Ambitions

Turkey already hosts around 50 U.S. B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base as part of NATO’s burden-sharing arrangement. These weapons are not under Ankara’s control, but their presence contributes to Turkey’s defense under NATO’s security umbrella. Until now, that arrangement has spared Turkey from pursuing an indigenous nuclear arsenal. 

The most plausible driver of a Turkish nuclear program would be a perceived existential threat from another nuclear power. During the Cold War, this threat was the Soviet Union, countered by NATO’s guarantees. Today, despite disagreements, Erdoğan does not consider Russia an existential danger; instead, Putin is often portrayed as a partner in diversifying Turkey’s foreign policy.

A more likely trigger would be a regional nuclear arms race. If Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia has already signaled it would follow. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in 2018: “Without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” In such a scenario, with Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all nuclear-armed, Egypt and Turkey could feel compelled to respond in kind. In 2019, Erdoğan declared that: “Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads. Not one or two. But [they tell us] we can’t have them. This I cannot accept.” 

Israel’s recent 12-day war with Iran, including direct strikes on nuclear facilities, has likely undermined Tehran’s nuclear prospects, if it ever had such ambitions. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has bolstered its security through a defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. This agreement has reduced the Saudis’ immediate incentive to develop a nuclear bomb, despite the fact that the defense pact is mostly symbolic.

Another scenario that could test Turkey’s reluctance to develop nuclear weapons is an escalation with Israel. In such a conflict, Ankara could not automatically rely on NATO’s nuclear deterrence. Article 5 requires consensus among all members. Washington, Berlin, and Budapest—among others—would be unlikely to support extending security protection to Turkey in such a dispute. Nonetheless, NATO allies would likely intervene to calm tensions between the two sides, as U.S. President Trump did after the Israeli army bombed Qatar.

Still, Ankara and Tel Aviv already hold sharply diverging positions in Syria. Israel struck Syrian airports just before a Turkish delegation arrived to assess possible bases. Some security assessments in Tel Aviv even suggest that Israel has to prepare for a direct confrontation with Turkey.

Israel’s successful air campaign against Iran has shown Ankara how wide the conventional gap has grown. Israel, with extensive U.S. backing, maintains unmatched regional air superiority. Turkey, on the other hand, has only a single Russian-supplied S-400 battery and, after being expelled from the F-35 program in 2019, lacks the next-generation aircraft needed to close the gap.

Turkey’s ballistic missile program remains modest. Erdoğan said in January that Turkey had decided both to strengthen its stock of missiles with ranges of 800 kilometers and to accelerate its program to develop missiles with ranges of 2,000 kilometers. While he did not mention any specific country by name, the language revealed growing unease about Turkey’s deterrence posture. Turkey has also explored missile testing in Somalia, but its missile arsenal is not able to deter any foes in the region.

For now, Ankara’s calculus rests on deterrence through alliances and advanced conventional weapons. Yet circumstances could change. If NATO’s reliability continues to erode, if regional powers embark on a nuclear arms race, or if relations with Israel become more confrontational, Turkey’s leaders might reconsider their stance on nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as the Israeli–Iran war demonstrates, neither nuclearization nor ballistic missiles necessarily bring security. For Turkey, they could just as easily invite premature, avoidable, and potentially disastrous confrontations.