Ankara has repeatedly made clear that it opposes a military intervention against Iran. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated again on February 5: “We are doing everything to prevent these tensions between the United States and Iran from driving the region into a new conflict and chaos. We clearly expressed our opposition to a military intervention in Iran.” To this end, the Turkish government has also formed a sort of ad hoc alignment with regional countries to lobby the Trump administration against war.

The ceasefire signed on January 18 between Damascus and the SDF was not the product of prolonged bargaining or mutual compromise. It was imposed by developments on the ground that had already stripped the SDF of its bargaining power. As such, the ceasefire agreement formalizes the collapse of the March 10 deal and largely marks the end of the SDF’s ability to shape outcomes in Syria.

The protests in Iran are continuing to escalate. What started as a protest by traders against the fall in the value of the local currency, rising prices, economic mismanagement and worsening economic conditions in the country has quickly transformed into a growing movement for political change. This is evident from the chants of protestors and is threatening the legitimacy of the ruling clerical regime.

Turkey’s Syria policy is often portrayed as a case of foreign policy failure driven by ideology. According to this view, Ankara abandoned realism in favor of Islamist enthusiasm during the Arab Spring and later returned to pragmatism after paying significant political and strategic costs. While this narrative highlights an important shift, it relies on a simplified understanding of the relationship between ideas and foreign policy.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) emerged as a dominant military and territorial actor in eastern Syria following the U.S.-led campaign against ISIS. Their control of large areas has created sustained tension with Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the PKK. Turkey’s opposition to an independent SDF military structure, alongside Damascus’s efforts to reassert authority in eastern Syria, has made the status of the YPG, the SDF’s armed wing, a central issue in the negotiations, including the most recent talks in December.

The current negotiations and phone diplomacy have essentially boiled down to one key question: where Maduro will end up when he finally leaves power. Turkey has emerged as the most realistic destination for Maduro if he is pushed to leave power.

In the past year, through our various publications, analyses and podcasts, instituDE has strived to shed light on Turkey; its domestic politics, economy, foreign policy and human rights situation. We have worked to provide valuable information and comments on Turkey for the foreign observers as well as the Turkish public. We put effort into raising awareness on the human rights violations and authoritarian practices in Turkey.