Under normal circumstances, growing cooperation between two friendly nations with shared cultural ties would raise little concern. However, the increasingly visible high-level meetings between Ankara and Islamabad are taking shape amid heightened tensions between Pakistan and India. Each of these South Asian countries perceives the other’s foreign relations as part of a zero-sum competition.
India’s perception is that Ankara is not only favoring Islamabad diplomatically, but also materially bolstering its defense capacity in ways that impact the regional military balance. For Turkey, engaging Pakistan should not necessarily come at the expense of ties with India. Yet Turkey’s current policy risks reinforcing precisely that trajectory.
Defense Ties as a Game-Changer
The leaders of Turkey and Pakistan have met several times this year. In February, President Erdoğan visited Islamabad for the 7th High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, where 24 cooperation agreements were signed on defense, energy, education, and trade. On May 28, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan convened in Lachin for the second trilateral summit. Just days earlier, on May 25, Turkish President Erdoğan hosted Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Istanbul. Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, widely regarded as the country’s most powerful figure, also joined meetings with Turkish defense officials in Istanbul.
Turkey has also emerged as Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier after China, accounting for 10% of Pakistan’s weapons imports between 2020 and 2024, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Ankara has supplied drones, naval platforms, and advanced munitions, and considers selling the KAAN fighter jets to Pakistan.
Besides, latest tensions in the region have coincided with a number of Turkish defense engagements in Pakistan. In April, a high-level Turkish military and intelligence delegation, led by Lieutenant General Yasar Kadıoğlu, Chief of Intelligence of the Turkish General Staff, visited Islamabad. Turkish C-130 military transport aircraft landed in Pakistan in late April, prompting speculation about arms deliveries amid escalating tensions. Ankara officially denied these allegations. In May, during the skirmishes between Pakistan and India, the Turkish corvette TCG Büyükada docked in Karachi for joint naval engagements. Although the naval visit was prescheduled before the conflict, it was perceived in India as a show of solidarity with Pakistan.
On the other hand, the Ministry of External Affairs of India stated that Pakistan deployed up to 400 Turkish-made Asisguard Songar drones, which have a short operational range of 3 to 5 kilometers, during a cross-border raid on the night of 8th - 9th May 2025. India suspects that Turkish advisors were involved in the execution of the operation, as in past instances in Ukraine, Libya, and the Caucasus, where Turkish drones were operated by Turkish personnel. India, too, employed foreign-made drones, including Israeli Harop models, during the conflict.
In stark contrast, Turkey’s recent diplomatic calendar shows an absence of similar engagements with India — or any at all in 2025. Bilateral relations remain predominantly economic in nature. Turkish exports to India are limited, and the trade balance is largely in India's favor. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) data, exports to India have been around $1.5 billion over the past three years. Imports, however, have declined in recent years, from $10.7 billion in 2022 to $7 billion last year. Given this configuration, the boycott calls in India against Turkey are unlikely to produce substantial damage to Ankara.
A Fragile Relationship in South Asia
Turkey’s conservative and Islamist constituencies have a soft spot for Pakistan as a brotherly nation within the broader Muslim world. Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakistani poet, for example, is a revered figure in Turkey, especially due to his role in supporting Turkey’s independence movement. The current government in Turkey, rooted in these political traditions, leans toward public displays of solidarity with Pakistan.
Yet the India-Pakistan rivalry holds limited resonance for the broader Turkish public. Unlike conflicts in the Middle East — such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Syria — developments in South Asia do not dominate Turkish media or public discourse. Part of the reason is that the conflict carries no immediate consequences for Turkey itself.
Explicitly choosing sides in a fatal conflict may offer short-term solidarity but could inflict long-term damage on Turkey’s aspirations, particularly in trade, diplomacy, and multilateral forums. India, as a rising economic and political power, will play a crucial role in the future of Asia. Ankara’s engagement in platforms like BRICS, or its interest in expanding ties with the Global South, would benefit from constructive ties with New Delhi.
Turkey and Pakistan will continue to share long-standing cultural bonds that naturally foster goodwill. Nonetheless, Ankara needs to calibrate its actions in a way that avoids signaling overt alignment in regional disputes.
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