The latest unrest in Syria was precipitated by the circulation of a voice recording, allegedly made by a member of the Druze community, that insulted the Prophet Muhammad. The violence initially erupted in Jaramana and subsequently spread to Sahnaya, a predominantly Druze area on the outskirts of Damascus. Israel launched a strike against members of the Syrian security forces to signal its willingness to intervene militarily in order to protect the Druze community from 'extremist groups'.
This latest escalation gives rise to the scenario of a renewed phase of foreign intervention in Syria’s conflict. During the civil war, external powers intervened to support their respective local allies to shift the balance of power. Whenever one faction gained the upper hand—such as when the Syrian opposition drove back regime forces—Iran and Russia deepened their military involvement to preserve the Assad regime. As chaos spread and ISIS seized control over vast territories, Western powers deployed troops alongside their local allies to counter the extremist threat. Later, when Assad’s forces moved against Idlib, the last rebel stronghold, Turkey directly intervened to halt their advance, culminating in a fragile ceasefire brokered by Russia.
Throughout this turbulent period, major powers like Turkey, the U.S., Iran, and Russia managed to develop de-escalation mechanisms, such as the Astana Format. These arrangements allowed them to avoid direct confrontation, even as they continued to probe, challenge, and push the boundaries of each other’s spheres of influence. A comparable race to the bottom could emerge should intercommunal violence continue to escalate.
Druze and Israeli Strategy
Israel and Turkey, in particular, appear poised to reassert themselves. The recent clashes have already resulted in an Israeli military strike on Syrian territory. This intervention appears to reflect a broader Israeli posture positioning itself as a protector of the Druze community. Approximately 150,000 Druze live in Israel, including around 20,000 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In Israel, Druze citizens serve in the military and are publicly lauded for their role in national defense. Consequently, Israeli leaders increasingly view the Druze as a natural ally in southern Syria and a possible anchor for expanding a buffer zone beyond the Golan Heights.
Not all Syrian Druze align with Israel, and such ostensible support from the Israeli government risks feeding Damascus’s suspicions about their allegiance. This, in turn, may serve one of Israel’s strategic aims: keeping Syria fragmented and internally divided to ensure it remains weak.
A Pattern of Turkish Interventions
Turkey, too, is closely monitoring the developments. Ankara is committed to ensuring the survival and influence of HTS. In the event of sectarian unrest that could threaten HTS’s position, Turkey could deepen its military presence. Initial involvement could come in an advisory or reconnaissance capacity, and could escalate to combat operations. If formally requested by Damascus, Turkey could invoke such an invitation to justify a robust military deployment.
This scenario would not be unprecedented. Turkey deployed troops in Libya to support the UN-recognized Tripoli government and provided both weapons and crucial operational expertise in the fight against General Khalifa Haftar. Turkish-supplied drones proved useful in altering the course of conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan. By contrast, Syria holds far greater strategic and security significance for Ankara.
Meanwhile, escalating tensions between the SDF and HTS could delay or derail the long-anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces from eastern Syria. Washington has already begun scaling down its military footprint in Syria and is encouraging a political reconciliation between Damascus and the SDF. However, the final document of the Kurdish Unity Conference in Rojava—where Kurdish representatives called for a federal Syrian state—drew condemnation from both Damascus and Ankara.
The recent waves of sectarian violence in Syria suggest that stability will continue to be elusive. The civil war has exacerbated pre-existing ethnic and sectarian tensions, particularly between the Sunni Arab majority and other communities. Reports of targeted violence, intimidation, and dispossession—especially against Alawites—persist.
HTS must exercise control over its affiliated militias, refrain from attacks on minority populations, and commit to inclusive governance under a constitutional framework. Should it fail to do so, the risk of another round of destructive civil war involving external powers will increase.
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