Mehmet Çetingüleç. Ecevit'in Anıları: 12 Yıl Saklı Tutulan "Veda" Sohbetleri. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2018. ₺69.
The way the AKP has changed Turkey’s foreign policy is a contentious issue. Its ideology, a combination of populist Islamism and Turkish nationalism, comes to the forefront as the principal driving force of this policy (or policies) in the literature. No doubt, ideology is an important factor, but Islamism-nationalism is not the only ideological current that has favored strategic autonomy in foreign policy, irredentism, and transactional relations with the United States. Bülent Ecevit, a leading leftist politician in Turkey’s modern history, had a Turkey vision that was not much different from AKP’s in terms of these three key tenets of Turkish foreign policy although he would oppose Erdogan’s instrumentalization of religion and hot-tempered populism.
Ecevit, who served as prime minister four times, is one of the key figures of Turkey’s modern history. He became the chairman of Republican People’s Party (CHP) by overthrowing İsmet İnönü, the second leader of the Republic after Ataturk. He transformed the CHP from an elitist party to a people’s party by trying to reach out to the labor and rural classes. During his tenure, the CHP received 33 percent of the votes in 1973 elections and 41 percent in 1977 elections. After the 1980 coup, Ecevit established Democratic Leftist Party (DSP) and in 1999, assumed premiership for the last time in his political career. He was also the last prime minister before the AKP governments.
Ecevit was in the decision maker position in several turning points of modern Turkey. He was the key actor that led Turkey to carry out a military operation to protect the Turkish minority and invade northern Cyprus in 1974. He also overturned opium cultivation limitations – a policy which caused the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey. When Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdish separatist group (PKK), was captured in Kenya in 1999 with the help of the CIA, the prime minister was again Ecevit.
In this respect, Mehmet Çetingüleç’s interviews with Ecevit in his last years provides a rich perspective to the memories of a veteran politician. Ecevit'in Anıları: 12 Yıl Saklı Tutulan "Veda" Sohbetleri (Ecevit’s Memories: “Farewell” conversations which were kept hidden for 12 years) constitutes those interviews. The book, which was published in 2018, includes many details about his relationship with İnönü, Süleyman Demirel, Kenan Evren, Necmettin Erbakan, and Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Ecevit also gives his own perspective of the political turmoil of the 1970s, 1980 coup, civil-military relations, deep state, and his conflict with President Sezer which triggered the 2001 economic crisis. As Çetingüleç and his wife also had a personal friendship with Bülent Ecevit and his wife, Rahşan Ecevit, they conducted interviews in a friendly and sincere atmosphere.
Foreign policy issues, particularly Turkey’s relationship with the United States and European countries, constitute a significant part in the interviews. Ecevit strongly favors a Turkey that pursues a multifaceted foreign policy that cultivates relations with the Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries. In a way that reminds Ahmet Davutoglu’s Strategic Depth doctrine, Ecevit thought Turkey’s history is a rich source of influence in those regions. For sure, Ecevit saw Ataturk’s secular and democratic regime, not Islamism or neo-Ottomanism, as Turkey’s historical potential (452-453). Yet, after all, he believed history gives Ankara a distinctive advantage in its relations with its region.
Ecevit believed Turkey should not be dependent on the west. Although he actively took steps for EU reforms and supported Turkey’s EU membership goal as well as friendly relations with the United States (34), Ecevit thought that Turkey has its own potential especially if it becomes an influential actor in its region. Thus, regional activism could strengthen Ankara’s hand in its relations with the west too. Particularly in the Middle East and Balkans, the United States and Europe is in dire need of Turkey’s partnership.
However, for Ecevit, Turkey’s regional activism is not only a leverage in its relationship with the west. He thought that if the western countries insist in isolating and marginalizing Turkey, Ankara can establish its own autonomous sphere of influence or pursue a strategic autonomy. He did not give much detail about this but invoked İnönü’s response to President Johnson’s letter, “if necessary, a new world will be created, and Turkey will find its place in it” (23).
Ecevit did not support military adventurism or aggressive expansionism that Erdogan pursues. Yet, there are some samples of irredentism in Ecevit’s vision. He believed the necessity of annexing Mosul, Iraq (99-100). He reminded that Mosul falls within the border of Misak-ı Milli, an imaginary Turkish homeland that was developed after World War I. Thus, annexation of Mosul is a rightful cause as much as Cyprus. “Turkey's future and interests are at stake. That's why we must enter northern Iraq. This is not an adventure. If we don't enter, they will invade Turkey’s southeast. Their goal is to gather under a single roof to cover the Southeast and establish an independent state. We must take measures to prevent the disintegration of Turkey. It would be better if we can convince the US, but the US openly supports Kurdish groups. We [if necessary] should be able to do this despite the US. Let's not forget that we carried out the Cyprus Operation in 1974 despite the US.” This line of thinking is not unique to Ecevit among the Republican elites. Ecevit said the annexation of Mosul was İnönü’s last will which was inherited from Ataturk (99). Within this scope, it is not difficult imagining Ecevit to invade northern Syria if he thought that Turkey is being encircled by the American-Kurdish partnership.
Ecevit also promoted transactional relations with the United States (21). He believed in the necessity of Turkey’s partnership with the United States. Nevertheless, this relationship should rely on bilateral interests not values. Unlike Turkish-American relations, Turkey-Pakistan relations is not an interest-based relationship. Likewise, Turkey’s relations with the Central Asian countries rely on historical and cultural dynamics. However, Turkey does not share such a relationship with the United States (21-22). Thus, it is better if Turkey configures this relationship as transactional.
This does not mean that the Turkish foreign policy would look like same if Ecevit is in Erdogan’s shoes today. Ecevit would probably oppose Erdogan's Islamism in foreign policy. He would also criticize him for his hot-tempered and populist diplomacy. However, Ecevit’s memories are useful to understand contemporary CHP’s support for Erdogan’s military operations in Syria and Iraq or anti-American stance. It shows that strategic autonomy in foreign policy, military expansionism, and transactionalism in Turkish-American relations have an appeal across ideologies in Turkey’s political landscape.
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