There is an old, unforgiving rule in financial markets: when the relationship between risk and return appears to have broken down, it is rarely the risk that has disappeared. More often, it is the market's willingness to recognize it.

By activating the collective defense mechanism, the Turkish government is not only joining a war in Yemen but also becoming part of a regional conflict that could have much larger consequences than Ankara anticipates. As this regional war drags on, the stakes will rise for all parties, pushing them to take greater risks. Ankara may therefore find that what begins as a limited military deployment in Saudi Arabia ultimately ends centuries of relative peace between Turkey and Iran.

On October 5, 2026, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan agreed in Riyadh "to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments" under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. The decision puts the pact to its first real test and raises the question of how far Turkey is prepared to go in Saudi Arabia's defense. Our experts weigh in.

Last week, Saudi Arabia called an urgent meeting of the military chiefs of Turkey and Pakistan under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, as Houthi attacks on the kingdom intensified. When the chiefs met in Riyadh on September 25, they discussed intelligence sharing, military coordination and the integration of defense capabilities. The meeting has renewed the question of whether Turkey could be drawn into the war in Yemen.

Over the weekend of September 11–13, Yemen's Houthis captured the Red Sea port of Mocha and the island of Perim, completing their takeover of Yemen's Red Sea coast and increasing their control over the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Saudi Arabia was forced to shut down a critical oil pipeline that had become one of the kingdom's principal outlets to the sea after Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

On September 3, Turkey's central bank took back 16 tons of gold that it had pledged as security for a loan of roughly $1.8 billion in dollars. It was the last in a series of such deals that began with the Iran war, and the return lifted Turkey's gold reserves to 791.4 tons.

This submission to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) highlights severe issues undermining the integrity of Türkiye's judiciary, particularly focusing on rampant judicial corruption and impunity as well as human rights abuses which they facilitate. Based on the most recent incidents of corruption concerning members of the judiciary who serve in courts in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, this report seeks to examine the high-level corruption within the judiciary and the Turkish government’s failure or even willful ignorance in addressing it.

This report focuses on Turkey's prominence as an emerging market for cocaine trafficking and organized crime in the last decade. Cocaine production in Latin America has dramatically increased since 2013, and Turkey’s status as an emerging market has attracted the attention of Latin American government officials on the front lines of the cocaine trade.

This report sets out to provide a comprehensive analysis of the tactics employed by the Erdoğan administration to achieve repressive goals abroad and the vulnerabilities and how they are enabled by the AML and CFT regulation in place.

This submission highlights the ongoing systematic actions and omissions by Turkish authorities against the so-called members of the Gulen Group, framed as crimes against humanity. It demonstrates the violations of recommendations that even Türkiye has supported.

This report offers an update to the United Nations Committee against Torture (the Committee) regarding the obstacles to implementing the Convention against Torture (the Convention) in Turkey. As a coalition formed by a collective of former Turkish diplomats, our focus is on the systematic torture faced by former diplomats detained at Ankara Police Headquarters. We delve into the Turkish context and present insights from our organization.

His electoral victory in May 2023 gave President Erdoğan five more years to further consolidate his power, eviscerate institutions, fill the bureaucracy with yes-men and expand his corruption network. This, of course, raises questions about the Turkish political system’s chances of recovery, the prospects for democratization after Erdogan and the regime’s tolerance for his demise.